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Abstract
Essentially, the importance of social movements in any organized and even non-
organized settings cannot be underestimated. A number of social movements 
have actually emerged all over the world, with specific aims and objectives. 
Social movements are seen as organized groups, usually agitating for equality, 
better living conditions for people, justice, political representation, etc. In Nigeria 
today, there are more than one hundred social movements that have emerged 
to address a number of issues that are pertinent for the survival, growth and 
development of human lives and the protection of property. Specifically, in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the roles being played daily by the newly-emerged 
social movements addressing the core issues of underdevelopment, resource 
control, environmental protection and political marginalization cannot be under-
estimated. A number of approaches are being employed to drive home their 
demands by the newly-emerged social movements. However, this study is meant 
to evaluate perceived successes and dilemmas among members and leaders 
of some selected social movements, and to investigate the influence of personal 
characteristics, personality characteristics and environmental factors. A total of 
72 participants (members and leaders) of social movements participated in the 
study with 60 (83.3 percent) males and 12 (16.7 percent) females. The study 
was a survey which utilized ex-post facto design. Questionnaire format was 
employed for data collection and statistical analysis of multiple regression and 
descriptive statistics were employed in analyzing the collected data.
The results revealed that personal characteristics (gender, age, educational 
status, family background, marital status, religion, and faith) showed significantly 
independent and joint prediction of perceived successes among members 
and leaders of social movements [F(7, 64) = 3.69, P < .05; R2 =.29]. The results 
revealed also that personality characteristics (extraversion, conscientiousness, 
openness to experience, agreeableness, and neuroticism) showed significantly 
independent and joint prediction of perceived successes [F(5, 66) = 6.62, P < 
.05; R2 =.33]. Also, the results revealed that the environmental factors (degree of 
support from local indigenes, degree of support from Governmental institutions, 
level of agitations in the movements, and degree of group cohesiveness in the 
movements) showed significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived 
successes [F(4, 67) = 3.03, P < .05; R2 =.15]. The results revealed further that per-
sonal factors showed significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived 
dilemmas [F(7, 64) = 2.81, P < .05; R2 =.24]. Similarly, personality characteristics 
showed significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas 
[F(5, 66) = 6.66, P < .05]. However, the results revealed that the environmental 
factors did not show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived 
dilemmas [F (4, 67) = 1.31, P > .05; R2 =.07].
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The results were extensively discussed. And it was established that some 
personal factors, personality characteristics and environmental factors are 
relevant in the understanding of evaluation of successes among leaders and 
members of social movements. Also, the results established that some personal 
factors and personality characteristics are important in the evaluation of dilem-
mas among leaders and members of social movements. 
Keywords: Social Movements, Perceived Successes, Perceived Dilemmas, 
Niger Delta Region, Nigeria, Leaders, Members.
Introduction
The issue of social movements has attracted marked attention from international 
scholars. In Nigeria today, social movements are highly prevalent and fight for 
one just cause or another. However, this issue of social movements cannot be 
properly understood without considering its historical background around the 
world. For example, “throughout the history of the United States, social move-
ments have been a staple in the maturation of the country. Prior to the industrial 
revolution and development of the modern nation-state, insurgents organized 
within a small geographic area and pressed for change using idiosyncratic tac-
tics. However, a number of broad social changes transformed the way people 
pursue collective action. From middle class white women’s desire to be included 
in the American political process in the nineteenth century came the Women’s 
Suffrage movement. The insurgence of a generation of African Americans 
who felt they had inalienable rights that deserved to be acknowledged by their 
government led to the 1960s Civil Rights movement” (Bostic, 2007).
It is on record also that as early as the years of the American Revolution, the 
sophisticated mobilization of the American people showed the characteristics of 
a modern social movement (Bostic, 2007). For instance, women in Philadelphia 
were found to have proposed the creation of a national women’s organizational 
movement to raise money for the troops and to have refused to use British tea 
and fabrics. Women helped to ignite one of the earliest nonprofit organizations 
in the history of the nation, the “Daughters of Liberty” (which continues today). 
Women organized mass spinning bees for wartime clothes making, conducted 
national boycotts, and some women even disguised themselves as men and 
fought in the army (Evans 1989: 49, cited in Bostic, 2007).
Essentially, according to sociologist Doug McAdam in his political process 
model (cited in Bostic, 2007), a social movement is a continuous phenomenon 
that thrives on the ability of the progressive community to capitalize on political 
opportunities and translate such opportunities into social change. For exam-
ple, the Settlement House movement in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century served as an aspect of a larger Anti-poverty movement. The 
settlement houses focused on various social services, such as unemployment, 
childcare, and city sanitary regulations (Boyer, Clifford, and Sandra, 1998, 424, 
cited in Bostic, 2007). The federal government has adopted some portions of 
the settlement house movement’s agenda as public works, while many of the 
poverty related issues that Jane Addams and her peers fought for still exist and 
are being pursued by current nonprofit agencies (Bostic, 2007). Similarly, the 
social movement has also been coined as a group of people with a common 
ideology who try to achieve certain general goals together (http://www.wordwe-
bonline.com/en/SOCIALMOVEMENT). With this definition, it is clear that a social 
movement is usually about achieving commonly desired outcomes.
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According to Glãser (2004), one of the problems in understanding social 
movements as collectivities is that such an understanding implies a notion of 
membership. Membership in social movements has proven to be one of its most 
elusive features. As early as 1957, Turner and Killian (1957:246, cited in Glãser, 
2004) attributed an “indefinite and shifting membership” to social movements. 
This feature has been confirmed repeatedly (Glãser, 2004). Neidhart and Rucht 
(1991; 451, cited in Glãser, 2004) note that considering that movements do not 
have clear membership criteria and that, consequently, the difference between 
inside and outside is necessarily vague, is important to distinguish the following 
categories with respect to the movement’s adherents: i) core activists (which in 
turn could be subdivided into movement leaders, staff, transitory teams, etc.), 
ii) participant contributors, and iii) sympathizers. Essentially, Neidhart and Rucht 
(1991:451, cited in Glãser, 2004) clearly emphasize not to consider contributors 
and sympathizers as part of a movement. In a much clearer analysis, Della Porta 
and Diana (1999:17, cited in Glãser, 2004) go one step further in stating that 
“(s)trictly speaking, social movements do not have members, but participants”. 
The interpretation is of course at odds with treating social movements as a 
specific collectivity, which hints to the core problem of the discussion about 
membership. It is difficult to imagine a collectivity whose membership can be 
theoretically described but not completely empirically identified (Glãser, 2004). 
In line with this, Stoecker (1995:113, cited in Glãser, 2004) believes that a social 
movement consists of people who participate in demonstrations and identify 
themselves as involved in the movement.  
Another important factor associated with social movements is the issue of 
identity. Essentially, Glãser (2004) stresses that the collective identity of a social 
movement is ascribed a decisive role in the movement’s formation, persistence 
and effectiveness. Accordingly, the construction of a collective identity is seen 
as an ongoing process that occurs in the interactions among members of the 
social movement, as well as between the social movement and its environment 
(eg Melucci, 1988: 342-343, cited in Glãser, 2004). Additionally, it is emphasized 
that, at least for some members, participation in a social movement (and thereby 
sharing its identity) is not a means but an end in itself (Gamson, 1992:56, cited 
in Glãser, 2004). Glãser (2004) therefore notes that these statements indicate 
a strong link between identity and membership. In support of this, Diani (1992, 
cited in Glãser, 2004) highlights that collective identity plays an essential role in 
defining the boundaries of social movement and that only those actors, sharing 
the same beliefs and sense of belonging can be considered part of a social 
movement. 
In Nigeria today, a number of social movements have come up in their bid 
to draw national and international attention to a number of social, economic and 
political injustices. The movements include the Environmental Rights Action/
Friends of the Earth, Nigeria (ERA/FOEN), Movement for the Survival of Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), Niger Delta Wetlands Centre (NDWC), Niger Delta Human 
and Environmental Rescue Organization (ND-HERO), Ijaw Council for Human 
Rights (ICHR), the Niger Delta Focus (NDF), the Women Initiatives Network 
(WINET), African Environmental Action Network (EANET-Africa), Niger Delta 
Oil Producing Communities Development Organization (NIDOPCODO), Anpez 
Centre for Environment and Development (ACFED) and Niger Delta Peace Coali-
tion (NDPC). These are just a few of the environmental, human rights and civil 
society organizations in the region (Onduku, 2003).
In view of the development of social movements in the Niger delta region 
and the resulting unrest and expression of the feelings of neglect by the people, 
a new body meant to bring about peace in the region, known as Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC), was established by the Federal Government 
of Nigeria. By simple analysis, the Niger Delta is said to be a region that sustains 
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much oil exploration and exploitation by the agents of western economic powers. 
The Niger Delta basin is considered the mainstay of the Nigerian economy for 
its significantly high level of oil reserves. The region is also naturally endowed 
with viable deposits of hydrocarbon and gas reserves (Onduku, 2003).
The Niger Delta remains crucial to the Nigerian economy. The oil and gas 
that sustain the nation are produced in the region and its adjacent continental 
shelf. In recent years, the region has grown into a huge complex enigma that is 
difficult to explain even by the most informed analysis (Naanen, 2004). Accord-
ingly, this developed situation, which is an amalgam of ethnic conflicts, youth 
restiveness, insurrection and brazen criminality, has taken the form of ferocious 
internal wars (Naanen, 2004). 
Historically, the Niger Delta has always produced some of the major im-
pulses that define Nigerian history, led by palm oil in the 19th and first half of the 
20th century and crude oil thereafter (Naanen, 2004). Accordingly, the European 
scramble for protected oil markets in the region led ultimately to the creation of 
the Nigerian state by the British at the beginning of the 20th century. In the late 
1960s, the state thus created was threatened by secession, which resulted in 
a thirty-month civil war. This conflict was critically linked to the Delta. Naturally, 
since the 1990s, oil-related turmoil in the region has repeatedly threatened to 
unravel the cohesion of the Nigerian state (Naanen, 2004).
Also, another scramble for Niger Delta oil is going on among Western 
economies. The importance of African (Niger Delta) oil to the US economy, fol-
lowing the formidable challenges to American supremacy in the Middle East, 
is now well known (Naanen, 2004). The discovery of oil in the Niger region has 
aggravated its revolutionary tendency. The early 1990s marked a watershed in 
the Niger Delta struggle with the outbreak of the Ogoni revolution (Naanen, 2004). 
Accordingly, like savanna fire, a new phase of the struggle rapidly spread to the 
other parts of the Niger Delta. But lacking the kind of disciplined leadership that 
the Ogoni have, MOSOP (Mobilization for the survival of the Ogoni People), which 
has kept the resistance relatively non-violent from the Ogoni side, the struggle 
was made to assume a radical dimension elsewhere in the Niger Delta. At this 
stage, the demands of the Niger Delta people revolved mainly around the core 
issues of underdevelopment, resources control, environmental protection and 
political marginalization (Naanen, 2004). 
It was observed that the oil economy was generating a rapid momentum 
of its own as cheap oil money had a pervasive and corrupting effect in politics. 
The military and its civilian clientele (the “militariat”, according to ibeanu, cited 
in Naanen, 2004) accumulated fantastic personal wealth at the expense of 
national development. Control of oil-bearing land and controlled access to the 
transnational oil companies (TNOCS) became highly lucrative, generating intra 
and inter-communal conflict (Naanen, 2004). According to Naanen, ethnicity and 
local platforms for prosecuting the struggle for a share of the oil wealth, whereby 
large numbers of unemployed youths, alienated by their own social condition, 
which provided crack troops of the ethnic-based conflicts. Clearly, every major 
ethnic movement had its own youth wing, popularly known as “ethnic militias”, 
and in certain situations they served as the military arm of these movements. 
A good example is the Ijaw National congress (IYC), and the National Youth 
Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP) for MOSOP (Naanen, 2004).
Additionally, it is observed that having defended their ethnic and local 
communities with military forces, the youth discovered their own power and 
potential and as such were inspired and at the same alienated by the enrichment, 
through oil money, of the elite and their very elders. Thus the youth now went on 
to seize power from their elders in various localities. In Ogoni, insurgent youth 
forced into exile those chiefs they perceived to oppose the interests of the Ogoni 
people. In other places, youth put to death community leaders they deemed to 
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have misappropriated compensation or project funds from all the oil companies 
(Naanen, 2004). In essence, it is observed that for most community leaders, the 
fear of the young became the beginning of wisdom. Accordingly, village chiefs 
involved in power struggles against their opponents, especially over the control 
of oil funds, allied themselves with community’s youth groups. The youth power 
has therefore been mostly exercised in relation to oil companies and regarding 
projects involving money in the communities (Naanen, 2004). Along this line 
of revelations, in order for the youths to obtain legitimate or illegitimate shares 
of oil money, they occupied oil production facilities and oil company premises 
and took oil workers hostage. In some cases, in recent times, they have killed 
these hostages. In April 2004, five seized  oil workers including Americans were 
brutally murdered while negotiations for their release were still going on. The 
warlords and their private armies sustain themselves on a variety of oil-related 
sources, including what amounts to protection payments from oil companies 
and other corporate bodies (Naanen, 2004).   
To a considerable extent, the geographical location of the Niger Delta and 
its resources determine the traditional occupation of the people: fishing and farm-
ing. But politics is the major issue the Niger Delta (Onduku, 2003). This is mainly 
due to the prolonged neglect of the people’s welfare by the Federal Government 
of Nigeria and the nonchalant attitude of the oil multinationals (Onduku, 2003). 
The people of the Niger Delta believe that they have no substantial benefit to 
show for their sacrifices, despite being the “goose that laid the golden egg”―
the economic success that underpins the unity of the Nigerian State. They also 
believe they are now at that stage in history when they must put into practice 
an old proverb of them which states that “anyone who takes what belongs to 
a child and raises his/her hand up; when he gets tired he must put down his 
hand and the child will take his objects back (what belongs to him)” (Nwoka, 
2000, cited in Onduku, 2003).
However, security forces have always responded to demands put forward 
by the people of the Niger Delta in a brutal manner: many of the locals have been 
maimed, women have been raped and many have met untimely deaths (Onduku, 
2003). Local villages like Odi, Opia-Ikenyan, Okerenkoko and Ogoniland have 
been destroyed by the Nigerian military through the use of excessive force in 
counter insurgency measures (Onduku, 2003). Aside from this, Onduku notes 
that there is prevailing tension in the region. Specifically, according to Onduku, 
travels across the three core states of the Niger Delta –Delta, Bayelsa and Riv-
ers States– revealed how the instability in the region has translated into violent 
political, socioeconomic, ethnic and communal conflicts. In the urban cities in 
particular, there has been a resurgence of the ethnic animosities leading to con-
siderable violence and destruction. For example, in Warri, the commercial nerve 
centre of Delta State, a crisis erupted in March 1997 involving the three ethnic 
groups in the city: the Itsekiris versus the Ijaws on one side, and the Itsekiris 
versus the Urhobos on the other. The conflict revolved mainly around issues of 
political representation, land, political justice and social contract. The root cause 
of the crisis was the change of the seat of local government headquarters from 
Ogbe-Ijoh (an Ijaw community) to Ogidigben (an Itsekiri community) in 1997. 
Although the discord amongst the various groups has been traced back to the 
formations left behind by some of the early national political leaders, the people 
had over the years lived together, inter-married and peacefully participated in 
various local endeavors (Onduku, 2003).
Today, the security situation has compelled most of the oil companies 
to move to Port-Harcourt, which is a relatively safer city for oil business in the 
area. Most companies now employ their own security units (Onduku, 2003). 
For instance, Shell in Nigeria has a special arm of the Nigeria Police Force, 
trained by the national police force but funded and paid by the multinational 
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company. The riots of January/February 2003 were attributed to the maneuvers 
in the party primaries of the ruling political party, the Peoples Democratic Party 
(PDP), which is the major party amongst the 30 registered political parties that 
participated in the April 2003 elections (Onduku, 2003). Many attributed the 
disturbances to the perceived delineation of new political boundaries in Warri-
South Local Government Area as part of the exercises of the state electoral 
body –the Delta State Independent Electoral Commission– because of perceived 
political imbalance by some of the ethnic groups in the local council area. The 
Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) is the leading peoples’ organization at the forefront of 
the struggle for resource control and environmental justice in the Niger Delta. It 
was formed on December 11, 1998 with the issuance of the Kaiama Declara-
tion that revealed the unabated damage to the environment due to uncontrolled 
exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas, which in turn has led 
to numerous oil spillages, uncontrolled gas flaring, the opening up of forests for 
loggers, indiscriminate canalization, flooding, land subsistence, coastal erosion, 
earth tremors, etc (Onduku, 2003).
The Kaiama Declaration generated massive controversy and led to the mas-
sacre of hundreds of Ijaw youths in the hands of the security agents (Onduku, 
2003). Despite being labelled as one of the most volatile military groups in the re-
gion, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) has continued to intervene to prevent the involve-
ment of some youth groups in sea-piracy activities in the riverine communities, an 
activity which still prevails especially in the Bomadi Local Government Area which 
is the axis of the region (Onduku, 2003). The group had in the past intervened in 
the release of expatriate staff of the oil companies that had been made hostages, 
kidnapped and hijacked by armed youths in the region. Such activities have been 
labelled as an anti-Ijaw struggle geared towards self-determination and resource 
control. Therefore, the IYC has consistently taken their campaigns to the rural 
communities, government and the oil multinationals (Onduku, 2003).
In another dimension, social movements have also been identified in Latin 
America. Notably, the last two decades have seen an upsurge of Latin American 
social movements  challenging the neoliberal paradigm and the governments 
that impose it. Movements such as the indigenous mobilization against water 
privatizations of CONAIE in Ecuador, the cocaleros and mobilization against 
water privatization and gas pipeline investments in Bolivia, the Zapatista move-
ment in Mexico, the landless rural workers of the MST in Brazil, Afro Colombians 
resisting displacement in a region coveted by investors, and the piquetero erup-
tions of workers and the urban poor in the wake of Argentina’s financial crisis 
confront the region’s political and economic systems (Stahler-Sholk, Vandem 
and Kuecker, 2007). 
For example, with reference to Brazil, aside from the identified social 
movement known as the landless rural workers of the Movimento Sem Terra 
or MST noted above, another social movement that is very well known in Brazil 
is the national grassroots consumer movement. Weingarten (2008) stresses 
clearly that, of all Latin American countries, only Brazil has a national grassroots 
consumer movement. Accordingly, being a long-time observer of Brazil, he 
has been interested in the social movements that have grown there since the 
late 1970s that have voiced the aspirations of ordinary Brazilians. Weingarten 
(2008) notes that he lived in Brazil in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the 
military government had been at its most repressive stage and any political 
activity outside narrowly defined channels was outlawed and prohibited. In his 
analysis, with the military government being found to have loosened its grip 
in the late 1970s, social movements such as the Liberation Theology’s Base 
communities, the Indigenous Peoples’ Defense of the Amazon Rainforest, the 
Movement to Protect Street Children and others started to appear across the 
large and diverse country.
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Weingarten highlights that he first heard about the consumer movement 
in Brazil unexpectedly one afternoon while he was listening to a national public 
radio program about consumerism in Sao Paulo, Brazil, called “Wacko Radio”. 
Several months later he read an article by Judi Chamber in which she men-
tioned meeting Brazilian “users” at a conference in Europe (Brazilian consumers 
call themselves “users”). Weingarten expresses that he called Judi in Boston 
to see if she had any information on Brazilian users, which she kindly gave to 
Weingarten. The name was that of the user spokesperson known as Graca 
Fernandez, based in Rio de Janeiro. Weingarten contacted Graca Fernandez 
and they had a discussion on some important issues regarding the movement’s 
plans to close mental asylums in Brazil.
Further, the growth and development of social movements in Asia cannot 
be undermined. For example, in Indonesia, Moniaga (2004) highlights that for 
decades the indigenous peoples of Indonesia had been engaged in low profile 
struggles against the loss of their rights and pride due to State policies, laws 
and activities. They started to organize themselves in 1999. Accordingly, more 
than 200 representatives of indigenous peoples from all over the country gath-
ered in the first congress of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (Kongress 
Masyarakat Adat Nusantara I, or AMAN I). The congress was originally initiated 
by Aliansi, Masyarakat Adat Kalimanta Barat / Indigenous Peoples Alliance of 
West Kalimanta (Aman Kalbar), Jaringa Kerja Pemetan Participatif / Participa-
tory Mapping Network (JAPHAMA) and Indigenous People Organizations and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) network (Moniaga, 2004). Moniaga 
further notes that the congress held in the heart of Jakarta gained large media 
coverage and resulted in the establishment of Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara 
(Alliance of the Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago) or AMAN.
In her analysis, prior to the congress, she showed that many indigenous 
people had been struggling to save their lands and lives. Many were said to 
stand up firmly against companies and local authorities taking over their lands, 
some struggled in quiet ways. In a much clearer analysis, Moniaga highlights 
how a number of struggles have been against P. T. Inti Indorayan Utama (now 
called P. T. Toba Lestari), who was granted permits to clear the forest and de-
velop timber plantation for its pulp and paper mill. In the same way, ten women 
led by Nai Sinta pioneered the struggle in defending their ancestral lands. The 
land was found to have been secretly transferred to P.T. Inti Indorayan Utama 
through forged signatories. In another case, youth and elders of Dayak Simpang 
Inketapang District, West Kalimanta, resisted a palm oil plantation development 
and logging concession on their customary lands. Similarly, Kalimanta the Dayak 
Bentians, who are known for their knowledge and skill in rattan cultivation, 
struggled against logging companies which planned to cut down their forests 
and run their rattan gardens (Moniaga, 2004). 
However, in his own analysis, Brahm (2006) notes that social movements 
have become a prominent part of politics around the world. However, they tend 
to have better chances of success in democratic systems; globalization provides 
opportunities for groups living under dictatorships to still put pressure on their 
government (Schultz, 1998). The democratization of communication media has 
both facilitated finding compatriots with similar interests, as well as allowing 
movements to spread their message and generate pressure for action. The 
Internet, in particular, has become a powerful mobilizing tool (Brett, 2005).
Groups utilizing online direct action use such tactics as cyber petitions, 
virtual protests, virtual sit-ins, virtual blockades, gripe sites, email bombs, web 
hacks, and computer viruses. Movements often use the same tactics they use 
offline, like petitions, not due to their effectiveness, but because they are famil-
iar (Meikle, 2002, cited in Brahm, 2006). Scholars have also been interested in 
examining what factors make movements more successful (Giugni, 1998, cited 
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in Brahm, 2006). Accordingly, Brahm (2006) notes that “success” is difficult 
to define as movement activists often have no consensus on this issue them-
selves. However, looking at 53 American groups that challenged the status quo 
between 1800 and 1945, Gamson in The Strategy of Social Protest found that 
groups were more successful if they were single-issue oriented, used selective 
incentives, used violence and/or disruptive tactics, and their organization was 
more bureaucratized, centralized, and not divided into factions. In addition, he 
finds that exogenous political crises can have significant effects, both positive 
and negative. Recent studies have also turned to consider how the broader 
environment affects the prospects for social movement success (Giugni, 1998, 
cited in Brahm, 2006).
Further, it is noted that some social movement scholars have decried the 
discipline’s obsession with being scientific at the expense of producing research 
that is of use to social movement activists. They are interested in “insight into the 
practices and experiences of organizers, into how collective and personal com-
mitment can be sustained, into relationships between day to day activism and 
“long-range vision”, into problems of intra-movement contention, organizational 
rigidity and democracy, etc” (Flacks, 2004). Movement activists are interested 
in insights from the academic community, but often do not find anything useful 
(Douglas & Chris, 2005, cited in Brahm, 2006).
From another point of view, much attention has been focused on fram-
ing social movements (Snow and Benford, 1988, cited in Brahm, 2006). In 
particular, many have looked at how social movements can effectively frame 
issues to bring about change (Benford and Snow, 2000, cited in Brahm, 2006). 
Injustice frames have been particularly common (Gamson, 1992b, cited in 
Brahm, 2006). In some movements, such as religious, self-help, or identity-
based movements, the injustice dimension may be less significant (Benford 
and Snow, 2000, cited in Brahm, 2006). “Only a handful of collective action 
frames have been identified as being sufficiently broad in interpretive scope, 
inclusivity, flexibility, and cultural resonance to function as master frames” 
(Benford and Snow, 2000, cited in Brahm, 2006), namely rights frames (Valoc-
chi, 1996, cited in Brahm, 2006), choice frames (Davies, 1999, cited in Brahm, 
2006), injustice frames (Carroll and Ratner, 1996a, cited in Brahm, 2006), 
environmental justice frames (Cable and Shriver, 1995, cited in Brahm, 2006), 
culturally pluralist frames (Berbrier, 1998, cited in Brahm, 2006), sexual ter-
rorism frames (Jenness and Broad, 1994, cited in Brahm, 2006), oppositional 
frames (Blum-Kulka  and  Liebes 1993, cited in Brahm, 2006), hegemonic 
frames (Blum-Kulka and Liebes, 1993, cited in Brahm, 2006) and a “return 
to Democracy” frame (Noonan, 1995, cited in Brahm, 2006). The movement 
literature has also examined how movement activists utilize “boundary fram-
ing” (Hunt, Benford and Snow, 1994, cited in Brahm, 2006) or “adversarial 
framing” (Gamson, 1995, cited in Brahm, 2006).
Specifically, in relation to Nigeria, Ikelegbe (2005, cited in Ojo, forthcoming) 
notes that the Niger Delta region has been embroiled in resistance against the 
Nigerian State and the multinational oil companies (the capitalists), and that the 
region is generally restive, with pockets of insurrection and armed rebellion. It is 
on record that decades of oil exploitation, environmental degradation and State 
neglect have led to impoverished, marginalized and exploited citizenry which 
after more than two decades produced youth-led resistance (Ikelegbe, 2005, 
cited in Ojo, forthcoming). The multinational corporations operating in the region 
include Chevron, Texaco, Exxon-Mobil, Total, Agip, SPDC, ELF and Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). And, it is on record that there are over 
600 oil fields, 5,284 onshore and offshore oil wells, 10 Export Terminals, 275 
flow stations, 4 refineries and liquefied national gas projects (Lubeck, Watts 
&Lipschutz, 2007:5, cited in Nwaodike and Ebienfa, 2009).
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 Research also suggests that social movement identification of problems 
and causes restricts the range of solutions and strategies deemed possible by 
the group (Gerhards  and Rucht, 1992, cited in Brahm, 2006). Social move-
ments appear to have little influence over the media organizations which cover 
themselves or their assertions (Entman  &Rojecki, 1993, cited in Brahm, 2006). 
Giugni (1998) highlights that early studies have been found to deal with the ef-
fectiveness of disruptive and violent action, and with the role of several organi-
zational variables for movement success. Furthermore, Giugni emphasizes that 
scholars have begun to analyze movement outcome in their political context by 
looking at the role of public opinion, allies and State structures.
Theoretical Considerations
A number of theoretical considerations have been offered to the understanding 
of the social movement. Essentially, according to Bostic (2007), studies of social 
movements have taken various forms and offered many explanations for the 
genesis and eventual decline of American movements. The definition of social 
movement that was utilized for this project was based in part on three social 
movement models. First, there is the classical model of social movements, 
which argues that social change is the result of a systematic “strain” on the 
social infrastructure of the political system. Hence, the commotion associated 
with the “strain” is transformed into feelings of anxiety, frustration, and hostility 
that lead to the emergence of a social movement (McAdam, 1982: 9). Secondly, 
the resource mobilization model argues that social movements are the result 
of the number of “social resources” that are accessible to “unorganized but 
aggrieved groups, thus making it possible to launch an organized demand for 
change” (ibid. 211). Although both models offer valid points about the cause 
of social movements neither one offers a complete analysis of the American 
social movement. 
The third model is McAdam’s political process model of the American Civil 
Rights movement and addresses the political and the sociological factors that 
neither the classical nor resource mobilization models focus on. The political 
process model is based on the assumption that political members reflect an 
abiding “conservatism” in order to substantiate political power. This conserva-
tism encourages political members to “resist changes that would threaten their 
current realization of their interests even more than they seek changes which 
would enhance their interests” (ibid, 38). Unlike the classical model, the politi-
cal process model relies on the notion that a social movement is a continuous 
phenomenon that thrives on the interplay of four factors: 
Emergence of broad socioeconomic processes that expand the •	
capacity for more political opportunities over an extended period 
of time. 
“Readiness” of the indigenous organizations when the political •	
opportunities become available. 
Emergence of a collective consciousness among the challenging •	
groups that encourage the belief that the movement is leading in a 
successful direction. 
Ability to win the support of external groups in order to broaden •	
the opposition against the conservative political structure (ibid, 40). 
In specific terms, the emergence, rising rate and militancy of the social 
movements in the Niger Delta region have been much associated with age-long 
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oil and gas exploration and exploitation which have consequently created a huge 
wealth for the existing multi-national corporations operating in the region and even 
the government, whose revenue earnings are no less than US$20 million a day. 
Yet, the people whose resources are explored and exploited have been made to 
suffer untold hardship. This has consequently led to different forms and degrees 
of conflict in the region. This led Ikelegbe (2005), a scholar, to view the ongoing 
conflict in his paper as “Economy of Conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria”. In this note, Ikelegbe puts forward a number of theoretical analyses to 
explain the ongoing crisis in the region. It is observed that the incidence of primary 
commodity exports and specifically mineral wealth in states has been found to 
be associated with conflict and the occurrence and duration of civil wars (Collier 
and Hoeffler 1998: 568–569; Mwanasali 2000: 145; De Soysa 2000: 123–124, 
cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). As such, this has been related first to the acute struggle 
for the control of resources, which is said to have increased vulnerability to con-
flict, violence and war. The struggle by rulers, counter elites and merchants for 
access to such resources (for accumulation and political consolidation through 
the patrimony) has indicated increasing appropriation and privatization through 
exclusive contracts with foreign firms, corruption, external and indigenous com-
mercial networks, emerging challenges from the excluded and ensuing conflicts 
and violence. This point has been underscored by the fact that these wars tend to 
be fought by State actors and the hitherto excluded or claimants to the resources 
and can be regarded as contests over power and wealth (Breytenbach n.d.: 
6, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Several conflicts in resource-rich states are usually 
characterized by a violent scramble to control natural resources (Reno 2003: 
45, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). This has led to the characterization of several wars, 
such as those in Angola, Sudan, Zaire (DRC), Liberia and Sierra Leone, in the 
form of resource wars, rebellion and insurgencies. It has been identified that in 
some places where these conflicts have occurred, both rulers and warlords have 
hired private security companies from different countries, such as the Ukraine 
and South Africa, to offer security assistance in exchange for privileged resource 
access (Mair 2003: 13, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005).
The second element underlining the economy of war theory is that greed 
for economic gains, or what is termed as economics of war, has been identified 
to be the primary drive or motivation for resistance and war (Reno 1997; Collier 
2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2001: 2. cited in Ikelegbe, 2005).  More specifically, 
there is a triumph of greed over grievance in the causation of conflicts (Reno 
2003: 45. cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Here, rebellion and violence are seen as in-
struments deployed to accumulate in the circumstance of economic crisis and 
decline and an opportunity to loot and illegally trade in primary commodities 
and minerals (Allen 1999: 372, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). 
Although, this has been underscored by the fact that the pattern, trend 
and tone of most conflicts and wars tends to indicate a concentration around 
resource-rich regions of countries.  For example, in a country like Liberia, 
rival factions were found to have been struggling to control the main diamond 
and gold producing areas (Ellis 1998: 157, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Keen’s 
analysis (2003: 67,  cited in Ikelegbe, 2005) notes that the pitched battles in 
the Sierra Leonean war, though rare, occurred mainly in the diamond rich 
areas. In Liberia and DRC, personal militia and armed networks were un-
derpinned by the struggle for control of external commerce and social and 
trade networks (Ellis 1998: 161, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Rebels, warlords 
and insurgents are known to struggle for control through external commercial 
networks, illegal trading and violence (Nafziger & Auvinen 2002: 158, cited 
in Ikelegbe, 2005).
 The third element is that the realities of conflict, violence and war in 
resource-rich regions have involved profiting by rulers, warlords and traders 
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(Nafziger and Auvinen 2002: 159, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Violence, as Ellis 
(1998: 157) depicted in Liberia, can become a form of business rather than an 
instrument for furthering any coherent ideological or even ethnic interest.
The fourth element is that wars and conflicts in Africa have in recent 
times had a considerable involvement of mercantilists, who have capitalized 
on the profits of scarce resources (Breytenbach n.d., cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). 
Here, mercantilists such as foreign mining and mineral exploiting companies 
have usually partnered and taken sides with State or the non-State actors 
in order to obtain access to participate in formal or informal trading and in 
legal or illegal exploration. Several companies, foreign commercial interests 
and private military companies supported rebels and government forces in 
Sierra Leone (Breytenbach n.d.: 7, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). It is  on record 
that French and Lebanese commercial interests won concessions of minerals 
and forest products from rebels in exchange for vital credit and equipment 
(Richard n.d.: 143, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Ellis (1998: 164, cited in Ikelegbe, 
2005) is said to bring to the limelight the fact that there were sophisticated 
deals, specialist operators, professional import and export traders and Afri-
can, American, Asian, European and Middle Eastern Companies in the war 
economy of Liberia. 
The fifth element has been that warlords usually characterize African insur-
gencies, rebellion and wars. These warlords, according to Breytenbach (n.d: 7, 
cited in Ikelegbe, 2005), are to a point more interested in resource capture and 
in maintaining a territory for resource exploitation. Warlords have been known 
to impose quasi-taxes on mineral resource exploitation and trade (Mair 2003: 
12–13, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Also, warlords and insurgents, particularly, thrive 
on illegal international trading and export of looted minerals and timber through 
foreign firms and agents, as was the case in Angola, Liberia, Congo, Kinshasa 
and Sierra Leone (Reno 1993; 1996, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). 
However, it is now very clear how different actors, such as operators 
of multinational corporations, warlords, insurgents and many others, benefit 
immensely from crises. This is presently the case in the oil-rich Niger Delta 
region. This study is informed on the need to actually evaluate perceived 
successes and dilemmas among selected leaders and members of some 
selected social movements in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria, examining 
the contributions of personal factors, personality characteristics, and envi-
ronmental factors. It is expected that these factors should be able to provide 
an empirical understanding to the assessment of successes and dilemmas 
among leaders and members of these social movements. It is hypothesized 
therefore that personal factors (gender, age, educational status, marital sta-
tus, family background, belief in religion and religion) will show significantly 
independent and joint prediction of perceived successes among leaders 
and members of social movements. It is also hypothesized that personality 
characteristics (extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, consci-
entiousness and agreeableness) will show significantly independent and joint 
prediction of perceived successes. It is also hypothesized that environmental 
factors (degree of support from local indigenes, degree of support from gov-
ernmental institutions, degree of group cohesiveness in the movement and 
level of agitation in the movement) will show significantly independent and joint 
prediction of perceived successes. It is further hypothesized that personal 
factors will show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived 
dilemmas. It is further hypothesized that personality characteristics will show 
significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas. It is finally 
hypothesized that environmental factors will show significantly independent 
and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas.
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Design
This study was a survey, which utilized ex-post facto design. The design was 
found appropriate because the author of the study was not involved in variable 
manipulation. This was so because the variables being measured were already 
in existence in the study areas and among the study participants. The studied 
independent variables were personal factors (ie gender, age, educational status, 
marital status, family background, religion, and belief in religion); personality 
characteristics (ie extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, conscien-
tiousness, and agreeableness) and environmental factors (ie degree of support 
from local indigenes, degree of support from governmental institutions, degree 
of group cohesiveness in the movement, and level of agitation in the movement). 
The study dependent variables were perceived successes (ie perceived suc-
cesses resulting from agitation in the region and perceived general indicators 
of success) and perceived dilemmas.
Setting
The study data were collected across the three states (ie Delta State, Rivers 
State and Bayelsa State) that make up the Niger Delta region. Some identified 
communities in each of the states were approached for data collection. In all, 
a total of four communities were selected, thereby making up a total of twelve 
communities across the three selected states of the Niger Delta Region.
Participants
A total of 72 members of different social movements participated in the study 
as participants. Their socio-demographic characteristics are shown in table 1 
below:
table 1. Socio-Demographic (personal) characteristics of the participants for the study 
Variables N %
Gender:
Male 60 83.2
Female 12 16.7
Marital Status:
Never Married 24 33.3
Married 42 58.3
Divorced 1   1.4
Separated  3   4.2
Widowed  2   2.8
Educational Status:
No formal Education  4   5.6
Primary School Certificate Holders  4   5.6
Secondary School Certificate Holders  10 13.9
Ordinary National Diploma/National 
Certificate of Education Holders 18 25.0
Higher National Diploma Holders 14 19.4
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Variables N %
Ordinary National Diploma/National 
First Degree Holders 10 13.9
Post-graduate Diploma Holders  6   8.3
Masters Degree Holders  2   2.8
PhD Holders  4   5.6
Religion:
Christianity 40 55.6
Islam   3   4.2
Traditional Religion 29 40.3
Degree of support for movement activities from local indigenes:
Low 23 31.9
High 49 68.1
Position in the movement:
Ordinary Members 54 75.0
Executive Members 18 25.0
Level of Agitations for movement goals and activities:
Low 20 27.8
Average 30 41.7
High 22 30.6
State of Origin:
Bayelsa State 18 25.0
Rivers State 23 31.9
Delta State 31 43.1
Degree of Group cohesiveness in the movement:
Low 12 16.7
Average 37 51.4
High 23 31.9
Family Background:
Monogamous Background 44 61.1
Polygamous Background 28 38.9
Belief in Religion:
No 32 44.4
Yes 40 55.6
Xage= 32.39 Minimum age= 17 y
SDage= 7.11 Maximum age= 48 y
N =  72
Instruments
Questionnaire format was utilized for data collection in the study. The question-
naire was made up of four sections, namely Section A (personal/socio-demo-
graphic characteristics scale), Section B (the Big Five personality inventory), 
Section C (perceived successes in the region subscale, and perceived general 
indicators of success subscale), and Section D (perceived dilemmas scale).
Section A was designed to assess socio-demographic/personal character-
istics of the study participants. The measured socio-demographic characteristics 
included gender, age, marital status, educational status, family background, 
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state of origin, religion, belief in religion, etc). Also, measured in Section A of 
the questionnaire were: degree of support for movement activities from local 
indigenes, degree of support from governmental institutions for movement 
activities, degree of group cohesiveness in the movement goals and activities, 
and position in the movement.
Section C of the questionnaire was designed to assess perceived suc-
cesses. Therefore, the perceived successes scale was made of two other sub-
scales, namely perceived successes resulting from the agitations subscale, and 
perceived general indicators of success. The perceived successes resulting from 
the agitations subscale was a seven-item scale, developed and designed by the 
author of this study. The scale items were drawn from in-depth interviews with 
some selected indigenes of the three states that made up the Niger Delta region. 
Originally, the scale items were fifteen but through content validity conducted on 
the fifteen items, the experts’ judgments got the 15 items reduced to 11 items. 
Further, based on item analysis of the remaining 11 items, the items got reduced 
finally to 7 items, with the least item-total correlation being 0.61.
The perceived general indicators of success subscale was developed and 
designed by the author of the study based on literature search (see Gamson, 
The Strategy of Social Protest). Accordingly, Gamson, in The Strategy of Social 
Protest, found that groups were more successful if they were single-issue ori-
ented, used selective incentives, used violence and/or disruptive tactics, and their 
organization was more bureaucratized, centralized and not divided into factions. 
The perceived general indicator of the success subscale was made to have seven 
items, reflecting the issues raised by Gamson for successful groups.
In general, the two subscales which made up the perceived successes 
scale were made to have a response format likened after Likert-type format, 
ranging between  “strongly agree” (5), “agree” (4), “undecided” (3), “disagree” 
(D) and “strongly disagree” (1). High scores in the scale indicate high perceived 
successes while low scores in the scale indicate low perceived successes.
Section D of the questionnaire was meant to measure perceived dilemmas 
(ie challenges and failures). The scale items were developed and designed by the 
author of the study through a number of procedures. Firstly items were generated 
through literature search (see Onduku, 2003, Naanen, 2004, Moniaga, 2004, 
and Weingarten, 2008) and through in-depth interviews with some indigenes. 
The generated items were subjected to content validity (ie through the use of 
experts’ judgments). Further, the resulting pool of items from experts judgments 
were subjected to item analysis.
Essentially, the scale was originally a twenty-item scale, developed, de-
signed and based on literature search and in-depth interviews. While the scale 
items were subjected to expert judgments in order to establish the content 
validity, the scale items got reduced to 16 items. Therefore, based on the item 
analysis conducted on the 16 items, the items got reduced to 13 items with the 
least item-total correlation being 0.56.
Procedure
The study is an attempt to assess measures of success and dilemmas in rela-
tion to newly-emerged social movements in Niger Delta region in Nigeria. The 
study was targeted at the Niger Delta region. The core Niger Delta states are 
Bayelsa State, Delta State and Rivers State. In the year 2000, former President 
Olusegun Obasanjo’s regime expanded the definition of Niger Delta region by 
incorporating some other states, including Abia State, Edo State, Imo State, 
Cross-River state, Akwa-Ibom state, and Ondo State (see http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Niger_Delta). However, for the purpose of this study, only the core Niger 
Delta states (ie Bayelsa State, Delta State and Delta State) were used.
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Selected communities in each of the states were approached for data 
collection. Essentially, data collection was made possible with the assistance of 
some residents in each of the communities, who assisted actively in distribut-
ing the questionnaires to their fellow brothers and sisters, who are members of 
the new social movements in Niger Delta region. In all, four communities were 
selected randomly in each state, thereby making up a total of twelve communi-
ties for the three states in the Niger Delta region.
A total of 180 copies of the questionnaire were produced and distributed 
across the selected communities in the three states, with 60 copies of the 
questionnaire meant for each state. These copies were distributed as follows: 
15 copies for each community, across the four communities.
In order to encourage the study participants to respond to the question-
naire items freely, they were asked not to include their names or the names of 
the social movement they belonged to. Essentially, the participants were asked 
to respond to the questionnaire items as sincerely as possibly, and they were 
assured that their responses would be treated with utmost confidentiality. 
In all, out of the 180 copies of the questionnaire, only 93 copies could 
be retrieved with the assistance of some residents-turned-research assistants 
while the remaining 87 copies could not be retrieved. Out of the 93 copies, only 
72 were deemed fit and usable for data entry and analysis. The remaining 21 
copies could not be used because some of the participants failed to indicate 
their gender or age or some other personal characteristics, while some other 
participants filled the questionnaire poorly in general. 
The study lasted four weeks and three days.
Statistical analysis
The study utilized both the descriptive and inferential statistics. The descrip-
tive statistics were meant to obtain some summary information on some data 
such as mean (X), standard deviation (), percentages (%) and frequency. The 
inferential statistics were meant to test the stated hypotheses. Basically, multiple 
regressions were employed for testing the hypotheses. Specifically, the statisti-
cal package for social sciences (SPSS) version 10.0 was utilized for data entry 
and data analysis.
results
The results of the study are presented below. The results are presented in de-
scriptive and inferential form.
table 2. Descriptive statistics showing responses to perceived successes in the Niger Delta region
S/N Our agitations in the region have led  
to the following
SA A UN D SD X N
1 Creating awareness that social justice can promote the needed peace in 
the region
5
(6.9%)
15
(20.8%)
14
(19.4%)
20
(21.8%)
18
25% 2.57
72
2 Creation of some commissions by governments such as oil, Mineral 
producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992, now 
being replaced by the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
in 2000
- 23
(31.9%)
1
(1.4%)
30
(41.7%)
18
(25%
2.40 72
3 Creation of new state, such as Bayelsa state, from the old Rivers State. 3
(4.2%)
36
(50%)
- 20
(27.8%)
13
(18.1%)
2.94 72
4 Creation of Niger Delta University in Bayelsa State 9
(12.5)
20
(27.8%)
10
(13.9%)
19
(26.4%)
14
(19.4%)
2.88 72
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S/N Our agitations in the region have led  
to the following
SA A UN D SD X N
5 Overseas educational training for some selected brilliant students in the 
region in different areas of specialization
5
(6.9%)
19
(264%)
16
(22.2%)
13
(18.1%)
19
(26.4%)
2.69 72
6 Election of Sons  and Daughters to some coveted federal positions, 
such as the election of Dr. Jonathan Goodluck as the  nation’s Vice 
President
6
(8.3%)
25
(34.7%)
- 34
(47.2%)
7
(9.7%)
2.85 72
7 Governmental institutions at both the federal level and state level and 
even local level are now paying serious attention to the new social 
movements/ethnic militias in the region
16
(22.2%)
15
(20.8%)
11
(15.3%)
21
(29.8%)
9
(12.5%)
3.1 72
Note: “SA”= strongly agree, “A”= agree, “UN”= undecided, “D”= disagree, “SD”= strongly disagree, “X”= mean, “SD”= standard deviation
table 3. Descriptive statistics showing reponses to perceived general indicators of success of any movement
S/N Social movements can succeed with the following strategies SA A UN D SD X SD
1 Single  issue struggle/ orientation 10
(13.9%)
29
(40.3%)
- 12
(16.7%)
21
29.2%)
2.93 72
2 Using  selective incentives 2
(2.8%)
30
(41.7%)
2
(2.8%)
14
(19.4%)
24
(33.3%)
2.61 72
3 High level of bureaucracy in the movement 3
(4.2%)
21
(29.2%)
- 32
(44.4%)
16
(22.2%)
2.49 72
4 High  level of centralization 17
(23.6%)
23
(31.9%)
4
(5.6%)
12
(6.7%)
16
(222%)
3.18 72
5 Absence of factions 3
(4.2%)
19
(26.4%)
11
(15.3%)
12
(16.7%)
27
(37.5%)
2.43 72
6 Using violence and/or destructive tactics 5
(6.9%)
26
(36.1%)
8
(11.1%)
20
(27.8%)
13
(18.1%)
2.86 72
7 Receiving adequate support from her immediate environments 3
(4.2%)
37
(5.4%)
- 21
(29.2%)
11 3.00 72
Note: “SA”= strongly agree, “A”= agree, “UN”= undecided, “D”= disagree, “SD”= strongly disagree, “X”= mean, “SD”= standard deviation
table 4. Descriptive statistics showing responses to perceived measures of dilemmas being experienced 
by social movements in the region
S/N Our agitations are underscored by the following SA A UN D SD X N
1 Insincerity in the implementation of true federalism in Nigeria 9
(12.5%)
33
(45.8%)
13
(18.1%)
8
(11.1%)
9
(12.5%)
3.35 72
2 Inability to control one’s own destiny in one’s local environment 6 
(8.3%)
21 
(29.2%)
9 
(12.5%)
36 
(50%)
- 2.96 72
3. Federal government not being serious in alleviating people’s suffering 
and anger, other than shifting blames
1 
(1.4%)
38 
(52.8%)
12 
(16.7%)
10 
(73.9%)
11 
(15.3%)
3.11 72
4. Opportunists are using the crises in the region to make a profit by 
hostage-taking and robbing banks
12 
(16.7%)
36 
(50%)
12 
(16.7%)
5
(6.9%)
7
(9.7%)
3.50 72
5. Easy avenue for the corrupt government officials to loot, by hiding behind 
the excuse of  “paying for hostage release” to steal from the public
8 
(11.1%)
41 
(56.9%)
2 
(2.8%)
15 
(20.8%)
6 
(8.3%)
3.42 72
6. Some members of our movements are greedy and selfish 32 
(44.4%)
9 
(12.5%)
2 
(2.8%)
17 
(23.6%)
12 
(16.7%)
3.13 72
7. Rising rate of poverty in the region 30 
(41.7%)
14 
(19.4%)
9 
(12.5%)
14 
(19.4%)
5 
(6.9%)
2.97 72
8. Rising poor standards of living among the people of the region 36 
(50%)
17 
(23.6%)
4 
(5.6%)
8 
(11.1%)
7 
(9.7%)
3.05 72
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S/N Our agitations are underscored by the following SA A UN D SD X N
9. Rising rate of other selfish groups in the name of fighting for justice 26 
(36.1%)
14 
(19.4%)
3 
(4.2%)
18 
(25.0%)
11 
(15.3%)
3.19 72
10. Practical neglect by governments in improving the people’s living 
conditions despite billions of dollars being made in the area
8 
(11.1%)
23 
(31.9%)
12 
(16.7%)
10 
(13.9%)
19 
(26.4%)
2.88 72
11. Corruption among government officials in the region 34 
(47.2%)
16 
(22.2%)
5 
(6.9%)
11 
(15.3%)
6 
(8.3%)
3.60 72
12. People in the region are still suffering from environmental degradation 
and pollution through oil spillage and gas flaring
33 
(45.8%)
17 
(23.6%)
- 13 
(18.1%)
9 
(12.5%)
3.50 72
13. Tidal waves spread spilled oil through the mangroves and on to 
farmlands rendering them infertile
30 
(41.7%)
26 
(36.1%)
2 
(2.8%)
6 
(8.3%)
8 
(11.1%)
3.89 72
Note: “SA”= strongly agree, “A”= agree, “UN”= undecided, “D”= disagree, “SD”= strongly disagree, “X”= mean, “SD”= standard deviation
hypotheses testing
Hypothesis One
This hypothesis propounded that personal characteristics (gender, age, edu-
cational status, marital status, family background, belief in religion, and religion) 
would show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes among 
members and leaders of social movements. The hypothesis was tested by 
multiple regression and the result is shown on table 5 below.
table 5. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of perceived 
successes by personal characteristics
Predictors ß t P F P R2
Gender
Age
Marital Status
Educational Status
Family background
Belief in religion
Religion
-.49
-.08
.11
-.04
.13
.28
-.09
-4.35
-.74
.94
-.40
1.12
2.53
-.76
<.05
>.05
>.05
>.05
>.05
<.05
>.05
3.69 <.05 .29
Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance
                                          
The results in table 5 above clearly revealed that personal characteristics showed 
significantly independent prediction of perceived successes [F (7, 64) = 3.69, 
p < .05; R2 =.29]. The results clearly revealed further that gender (ß = -.49, t = 
-4.35, p < .05) and belief in religion (ß = .28, t = 2.53, p<.05) showed signifi-
cantly independent prediction of perceived successes, respectively. However, 
the results revealed that age (ß = -.03, t = -.74, p>.05), marital Status (ß = .11, t 
= .94, p > .05), educational background (ß = -.04, t = -.40, p>.05), family back-
ground (ß = .13, t = 1.12, p > .05) and religion (ß = -.09, t = -.76, p> .05) did not 
show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes. Therefore, 
hypothesis one was partially supported by the findings of the study.
Hypothesis Two
This hypothesis propounded that personality characteristics (extraversion, neu-
roticism, openness to experience, conscientiousness and agreeableness) would 
show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes. The hypoth-
esis was also tested by multiple regressions. Table 6 shows the results clearly.
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table 6. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of perceived 
successes by personality characteristics
Predictors ß t P F P R2
Openness to experience
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Neuroticism
.41
.38
.40
.00
.18
3.47
3.03
3.27
.01
1.50
<.05
<.05
<.05
>.05
>.05
6.62 <.05 .33
Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance
The results in table 6 revealed that personality characteristics showed signifi-
cantly joint prediction of perceived successes among leaders and members 
of social movements [F (5, 66) = 6.62, p < .05; R2 = .33]. Further, personality 
characteristics of openness to experience (ß = .41, t = 3.47, p<.05), conscien-
tiousness (ß = .38, t = 3.03, p<.05), and extraversion (ß = .40, t = 3.27, p<.05) 
showed significantly independent prediction of perceived successes, respec-
tively. However, only personality characteristics of agreeableness (ß = .00, t = 
.01, p>.05) and neuroticism (ß = .18, t = 1.50, p>.05) did not show significantly 
independent prediction of perceived successes. Therefore, hypothesis two was 
partially supported by the study findings.
Hypothesis Three
This hypothesis propounded that environmental factors (degree of support from 
local indigenes, degree of support from governmental institutions, degree of 
group cohesiveness in the movement and level of agitation in the movement) 
would show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived suc-
cesses among members and leaders of social movements. The hypothesis was 
tested by multiple regressions. The result is shown in table 7 below.
table 7. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of perceived 
successes by the environmental factors
 Predictors ß t P F P R2
Degree of support from local indigenes
Degree of support from governmental institutions
Level of agitation in the movement
Degree of group cohesiveness in the movement 
.18
-.14
-.27
.15
1.53
-1.21
-2.24
1.24
>.05
>.05
<.05
>.05
3.03 <.05 .15
Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance
The results in table 7 above revealed that the environmental factors showed 
significantly independent prediction of perceived successes [F (4, 67) = 3.03, 
p<.05; R2 = .15]. Also, the results revealed that the level of agitation in the move-
ments showed significantly independent prediction of perceived successes. 
However, the results revealed that the degree of support from local indigenes 
(ß = .18, t = 1.53, p>.05), degree of support from governmental institutions (ß = 
.14, t = 1.21, p>.05) and degree of group cohesiveness in the movement (ß = .15, 
t = 1.24, p>.05) did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived 
successes respectively. Therefore, hypothesis three was partially supported 
by the study findings.
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Hypothesis Four
This hypothesis propounded that personal characteristics would show signifi-
cantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas among leaders 
and members of social movements. The hypothesis was tested also by multiple 
regressions. The result is shown in table 8 below.
table 8. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of perceived 
dilemmas by personal characteristics
Predictors ß t P F P R2
Gender
Age
Marital Status
Educational Status
Family Background
Belief in Religion
Religion
.01
.14
-.04
.41
-.17
.04
.16
.06
1.27
-.35
3.62
-1.37
.35
-1.38
>.05
>.05
>.05
<.05
>.05
>.05
>.05
2.81 <.05 .24
Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance
The results in table 8 above revealed that the personal characteristics showed 
significantly joint prediction of perceived dilemmas [F (7, 64) = 2.81, p<.05; R2 
= .24]. The results revealed further only the personal characteristic concerning 
educational status (ß = .41, t = 3.62, p<.05) showed significantly independent 
prediction of perceived dilemmas. However, the results clearly revealed that 
gender (ß = .01, t = .06, p>.05), age (ß = .14, t = 1.27, p>.05), marital status (ß 
= -.04, t = .35, p>.05), family background (ß = -.17, t = -1.37, p >.05), belief in 
religion (ß = .04, t = .35, p>.05) and religion (ß = .16, t = -1.38, p>.05) did not 
show significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas respectively. 
Therefore, hypothesis four was also partially supported by the study findings.
Hypothesis Five
This hypothesis propounded that personality characteristics would show sig-
nificantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas among leaders and 
members of social movements. The hypothesis was tested by multiple regres-
sions. The result is shown in table 9 below.
table 9. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of perceived 
dilemmas by personality characteristics
Predictors ß t P F P R2
Openness to experience 
Conscientiousness 
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Neuroticism
-.00
.19
.08
.57
-.05
-.02
1.49
.59
4.29
-.38
>.05
>.05
>.05
<.05
>.05
6.66 <.05 .34
Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance
The results in table 9 clearly revealed that the personality characteristics showed 
significantly joint prediction of perceived dilemmas among leaders and members 
of social movements (F (5, 66) = 6.66, p<.05; R2 = 34). The results revealed very 
clearly that only personality characteristics of agreeableness (ß = .57, t= 4.29, 
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p<.05) showed significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas. The 
results, however, revealed that openness to experience (ß =-.00, t=-.02, p>.05), 
conscientiousness (ß = - 1.9, t=1.49, p>.05) extraversion (ß =.08, t=.59, p>.05) 
and neuroticism (ß =-.05, t=-.38, p>.05) did not show significantly independent 
prediction of perceived dilemmas respectively. Therefore, hypothesis five was 
partially supported by the study results.
Hypothesis Six
This hypothesis propounded that environmental factors would show significantly 
independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas among leaders and 
members of social movements. The hypothesis was tested also by multiple 
regressions. The result is shown in table 10 below.
table 10. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of 
perceived dilemmas by the environmental factors
Predictors ß t P F P R2
Degree of support from local indigenes
Degree of support from governmental 
institutions
Level of agitation in the movement
Degree of group cohesiveness in the 
movement 
.15
-.17
-.00
-.17
1.21
-1.40
-.02
1.38
>.05
>.05
>.05
>.05
1.31 >.05 .07
Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance
The results in table 10 above clearly revealed that the environmental factors did 
not show significantly joint prediction of perceived dilemmas [F (4, 67) = 1.31, 
p > 05; R2 = .07]. The results, however, revealed that degree of support from 
local indigenes (ß =-.15, t= 1.21, p>.05), degree of support from governmental 
institutions (ß = -.17, t = -1.40, p>.05), level of agitations in the movement (ß =-.00, 
t=-.02, p>.05) and degree of cohesiveness in the movement (ß =-.17, t=-1.38, 
p>.05) did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas. 
Therefore, it was made clear, based on the results in table 10, that hypothesis 
six was not supported by the study findings.
Discussion
This study was meant to investigate perceived successes and dilemmas 
of some new social movements in the Niger Delta region. The study investigated 
empirically the influence of personal characteristics, personality characteristics 
and environmental factors on perceived successes and dilemmas among lead-
ers and members of some selected social movements. The study was actually 
a survey which measured the study variables with the use of a questionnaire. 
Six hypotheses were tested in the study, using multiple regressions to test the 
stated hypotheses.
Based on the results shown in tables 2 through 4, reflecting on the de-
scriptive statistics of responses to perceived successes (successes based on 
agitations and indicators of successful movements) and perceived dilemmas, 
it was revealed clearly that the study participants responded differently. For 
example, based on results in table 2, it was clearly revealed that more study 
participants indicated that “governmental institutions at both the federal level, 
state level and even local level are now paying serious attention to the newly-
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emerged social movements/ethnic militias in the region, with 22.2 percent of 
the participants indicating “strongly agree”; 20.8 percent indicating “agree”; 15.3 
percent indicating “undecided”; 29.8 percent indicating “disagree” while 12.5 
percent indicating “strongly disagree”. Similarly, as regards results in table 3, 
for example, it was revealed that more study participants indicated that a “high 
level of centralization” is one of the indicators of successful social movements, 
with 23.6 percent of the study participants indicating “strongly agree”; 31.9% 
indicating “agree”; 5.6 percent indicating “undecided”; 16.7 percent indicating 
“disagree” while 22.2 percent indicated “strongly disagree”. Also, based on table 
4, for example, it was clearly revealed that more study participants expressed 
that their agitations in the region have been a dilemma due to the fact that they 
have provided an “easy avenue for the corrupt government officials to steal 
from the public by hiding behind excuse of ‘paying for hostage release’”, with 
11.1 percent of the study participants indicating “strongly agree”; 56.9 percent 
indicating “agree”, 2.8 percent indicating “undecided”; 20.8 percent indicating 
“disagree”, while 8.3 percent indicated “strongly disagree”.
Hypothesis one, which propounded that personal characteristics (gender, 
age, educational status, marital status, family background, belief in religion, and 
religion) would show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived 
successes among members and leaders of social movements was partially 
supported by the study results. The results clearly showed that personal char-
acteristics showed significantly joint prediction of perceived successes, with 
29 percent of the variance in perceived successes being accounted for by the 
personal characteristics. The results further revealed that only gender and belief 
in religion showed significantly independent prediction of perceived successes, 
respectively. However, other personal characteristics (ie age, educational sta-
tus, marital status, family background and religion) did not show significantly 
independent prediction of perceived successes, respectively.
The results, as shown in table 5, revealed that some personal charac-
teristics are relevant in perceived successes among leaders and members of 
social movements. Clearly, the results showed that, as regards gender, females 
reported more perceived successes than males. Similarly, as regards belief 
in religion, members and leaders of social movements with a strong belief in 
religion reported more perceived successes than members and leaders with 
not-so-strong belief in religion. Additionally, other personal characteristics, such 
as age, marital status, educational status, religion and family background, were 
found not to have a significantly independent role on perceived successes among 
members and leaders of social movements.
Hypothesis two, which propounded that personality characteristics (extra-
version, neuroticism, openness to experience, conscientiousness and agreeable-
ness) would show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes, 
was partially supported by the study results. The results clearly revealed that 
personality characteristics showed significantly joint prediction of perceived suc-
cesses, with 33 percent of the variance in perceived successes being accounted 
for by the personality characteristics. Similarly, the personality characteristics of 
openness to experience (ß = .41, t =3.47, p <.05), conscientiousness (ß =-.38, t 
= 3.03, p < .05) and extraversion (ß = .40, t = 3.27, p < .05) showed significantly 
independent prediction of perceived successes, respectively. However, the re-
sults made it clear that personality characteristics of agreeableness (ß =-.00, t 
= .01, p>.05) and neuroticism (ß = .18, t = 1.50, p>.05) did not show significantly 
independent prediction of perceived successes, respectively.
Based on the results described above, it was made clear that personality 
characteristics are relevant in perceived successes of agitations and expecta-
tions among members and leaders of social movements while all the considered 
personality characteristics were shown to have significantly joint prediction of 
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perceived successes, personality characteristics of openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, and extraversion were shown to have, respectively, signifi-
cantly independent prediction of perceived successes.
Hypothesis three, which propounded that environmental factors (degree 
of support from local indigenes, degree of support from governmental institu-
tions, level of agitations in the movement and degree of group cohesiveness 
in the movement) would show significantly independent and joint prediction of 
perceived successes among members and leaders of social movements was 
partially supported by study results. The results, specifically, revealed that the 
environmental factors have a significantly joint prediction of perceived successes, 
with 15 percent of the variance in perceived successes being accounted for by 
the environmental factors. Similarly, only the environmental factor of degree of 
group cohesiveness in the movement was found to have a significantly inde-
pendent prediction of perceived successes. 
It was made clear, however, that degree of support from local indigenes, 
degree of support and degree of group cohesiveness in the movement were 
found not to have a significantly independent prediction of perceived suc-
cesses.
Hypothesis four, which propounded that personal characteristics would 
show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas 
among members and leaders of the social movement, was supported partially 
by the study results. Essentially, the obtained results revealed that the personal 
characteristics showed significantly joint prediction of perceived dilemmas, 
with 24 percent of the variance in perceived dilemmas being accounted for the 
considered personal characteristics. The results, specifically, revealed that only 
personal characteristic of educational status showed significantly independent 
predicted of perceived dilemmas. However, other personal characteristics such 
as gender, age, marital status, educational status, family background, belief in 
religion, and religion did not show significantly independent prediction of per-
ceived dilemmas, respectively.
In a clearer analysis, the results above portrayed that the personal charac-
teristics could jointly explain perceived dilemmas among members and leaders 
of social movements but only the personal characteristics of educational status 
could significantly and independently explain perceived dilemmas. This clearly 
portrayed that members and leaders of social movements with higher educa-
tional status reported more perceived dilemmas than members and leaders of 
social movements with lower educational status.
Further, hypothesis five, which propounded that personality character-
istics would show significantly joint and independent prediction of perceived 
dilemmas among members and leaders of social movements, was found also 
partially supported by the study results. In the first place, the results portrayed 
clearly that the personality characteristics showed significantly independent 
prediction of perceived dilemmas, with 34 percent of the variance in perceived 
dilemmas being responsible for the personality characteristics. Similarly, the 
results revealed that only the personality characteristic of agreeableness had 
significantly shown independent prediction of perceived dilemmas. However, the 
results vividly revealed that personality characteristics of openness to experi-
ence, conscientiousness, extraversion and neuroticism did not show significantly 
independent prediction of perceived dilemmas, respectively.
In a way, the results described above depicted that, somehow, personality 
characteristics could jointly provide a good explanation for the understanding of 
perceived dilemmas among members and leaders of social movements, but the 
personality characteristic of agreeableness was found to provide an independ-
ent explanation for the understanding of perceived dilemmas. This means that 
members and leaders of social movements who showed high agreeableness 
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reported more perceived dilemmas than members and leaders who showed 
low agreeableness.
Hypothesis six, which propounded that environmental factors would show 
significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas among 
members and leaders of social movements, was not supported by the study 
results in any way. First, the results clearly depicted that the environmental fac-
tors did not show significantly joint prediction of perceived dilemmas. Also, the 
results revealed that none of the environmental factors (ie degree of support 
from local indigenes, degree of support from governmental institutions, level of 
agitations in the movements and degree of group cohesiveness in the move-
ments) significantly show independent prediction of perceived dilemmas. This 
now portrays that the environmental factors did not influence perceived dilem-
mas among members and leaders of social movements.
Conclusion
Today, it is very clear that the newly-emerged social movements in the Niger 
Delta region and the government at the three tier levels, particularly the Federal 
Government, have not had a good relationship. Onduku (2003) once expresses 
that the relationship between social movements in the Niger Delta region has 
been and remained one of mutual distrust. It is on record that the people of the 
region want a future for their unborn children and therefore are demanding a 
better deal, particularly for being an oil-rich region. And it is so unfortunate that 
the government wants to continue to maintain absolute control of the resources 
from the region while the multinationals strive for profit maximization by parleying 
with the State (Onduku, 2003). All of this has led to the continuing emergence 
of social movements, some of which are violent and whose members are ready 
to lay down their lives to get what they want. However, it is clear now that the 
way members and leaders of social movements assess success or dilemma is 
closely related to a number of factors, which include their personality, personal 
features and even some environmental factors. This suggests that members 
and leaders of social movements do take stock of their successes and even 
challenges. It is positive that our social movements still continue to agitate for 
resource control, environmental sanitation, job creation etc, even in the face 
of the newly-introduced Amnesty Programme for repenting militants, which 
suggests that more is needed to please militants. They may actually want 
a different way of life, but there should be an element of trust in the newly-
introduced Amnesty Programme, which became effective on August 16, 2009. 
Implications/recommendations
The study findings have shown the relevance of personal factors, personality 
characteristics and environmental factors to the understanding of evaluation 
of perceived successes and dilemmas among leaders and members of social 
movements. In a way, these findings have clearly shown that what leaders and 
members of social movements see as a measure of success or dilemmas can 
be explained by their personal factors, personality characteristics and even 
environmental factors. Therefore, if it is necessary to really assess success or 
dilemmas as regards the agitation started by social movements, then efforts 
must be made to look into their personal make-up, personality make-up or, 
better still, the environmental views of the leaders and members of the so-
cial movements.
Above all, efforts should be made to ensure the practice of true federalism, 
which will make the Niger Delta Region start benefiting from good governance 
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in Nigeria. On this note, it is on record that there is need to “…collectively call 
for the reintroduction of the revenue allocation principle as practiced in the past 
and as expressed in the Independence Constitution of 1964 which, according to 
them, was the condition under which the federal units agreed to come together 
as a nation. They also demand a review of the current 13 percent derivation 
formula, which is considered insignificant and cannot redress the devastation in 
the Niger Delta Region” (Onduku, 2003). Also, a number of these social move-
ments wanted the existing multinational corporations in the region to relocate 
their administrative headquarters to their areas of operation in the Niger Delta 
Region. I want to believe that if this is done, more opportunities will be available 
for the Niger Delta people, such as job opportunities, long-lasting infrastructural 
developments, genuine environmental sanitation of the already-polluted environ-
ment, genuine provision of needed social amenities and much more.
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